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Abstract—We study the rate of change of the multivariate
mutual information among a set of random variables when some
common randomness is added to or removed from a subset. This
is formulated more precisely as two new multiterminal secret
key agreement problems which ask how one can increase the
secrecy capacity efficiently by adding common randomness to
a small subset of users, and how one can simplify the source
model by removing redundant common randomness that does not
contribute to the secrecy capacity. The combinatorial structure
has been clarified along with some meaningful open problems.
Index Terms—secret key agreement, multivariate mutual in-
formation, principal sequence of partitions.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the multiterminal secret key agreement prob-
lem formulated by [1]. A group of users, each observing a
private correlated random source, discuss in public so they
can agree on a secret key. The key is a random variable that
needs to be recoverable by every user after the discussion.
Furthermore, the key must be secured against a wiretapper
who can observe the entire discussion among the users but
has no access to their private sources.
The maximum achievable secret key rate is called the
secrecy capacity. It was characterized by [1] as a linear
program. Because the wiretapper can listen to the entire public
discussion, the randomness of the secret key can only come
from the information mutual to the private correlated source
components. Indeed, in the two-user case, it was shown in [1]
that the capacity is equal to Shannon’s mutual information:
I(Z1 ∧ Z2) = D(PZ1Z2‖PZ1PZ2), (1.1)
where each user i ∈ {1, 2} observes the discrete memoryless
correlated private source Zi. The mutual information above is
written as the divergence D from the joint distribution PZ1Z2
to the product of the marginal distributions PZ1 and PZ2 .
In the multiterminal case, let V be the set of (two or more)
users, and ZV := (Zi | i ∈ V ) be a random vector where Zi
is a discrete memoryless source component privately observed
by user i ∈ V . There was a divergence upper bound on the
capacity in [1], which was identified [2, 3] to be tight in
the special case without helpers, giving rise to the alternative
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capacity characterization:
I(ZV ) := minP∈Π′(V )
IP(ZV ), where
IP(ZV ) :=
D(PZV ‖
∏
C∈P PZC )
|P| − 1 ,
(1.2a)
(1.2b)
and Π′(V ) is the collection of partitions P of V into two or
more non-empty disjoint sets.
Following [4], we call (1.2a) the multivariate mutual infor-
mation (MMI). It is easy to see that (1.1) is a special case
of (1.2a) when V = {1, 2}. Indeed, the MMI was formally
regarded in [4] as a measure of mutual information among
multiple random variables, thereby extending various interpre-
tations and properties of Shannon’s mutual information to the
multivariate case. The MMI has other operational meanings,
ranging from tree-packing [5], hypergraph connectivity [3],
undirected network coding [6], vocality constraints [7–9],
successive omniscience [10, 11] and data clustering [12, 13].
In this work, we want to study how the MMI of a set of
random variables changes with respect to changes in the MMI
of a subset of the random variables. We formulate two new
problems, called the incremental secret key agreement (ISKA)
and decremental secret key agreement (DSKA). In ISKA, a
subset of users is given an additional common randomness
in the form of a random source of certain entropy rate. The
objective is to find an efficient resource allocation, i.e., to
increase the capacity as much as possible without requiring too
much common randomness to be added to too many users. In
DSKA, we remove some common randomness from a subset
of users. The objective is to simplify the source model, but
without reducing the capacity much. In particular, we want to
identify redundant common randomness whose removal does
not diminish the capacity.1
II. MOTIVATION
We first explain the idea using a simple example. Define
the random source as
Z1 := (Xa,Xb), Z2 := (Xa,Xb), and Z3 := Xa,
where Xa and Xb are independent uniformly random bits.
The random bits Xj’s determine the correlation, or joint
distribution, of the sources Zi’s. Let V := {1, 2, 3} be the set
of users. Each user i ∈ V observes the discrete memoryless
1The idea of redundant common randomness first appeared in [3, Proposi-
tion 2.3]. It was called excess edge under a hypergraphical source model, and
was related to the notion of partition connectivity for hypergraphs. The idea
was also used in [14] in characterizing the minimum communication com-
plexity for secret key agreement, but under a non-asymptotic hypergraphical
source model when the communication protocol is restricted to be linear. [15–
17] further considered the non-asymptotic case and derived more efficiently
computable bounds on the communication complexity.
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2source Zi privately. It is easy to see that the users can agree
on a secret key bit, namely, Xa, without any public discussion.
In fact, the users cannot agree on any more secret key bits,
even with additional public discussion. This is clear since Xa
is already the entire private observation of user 3. The secrecy
capacity is therefore 1 bit.
For ISKA, we consider adding a common randomness to a
subset of users. For example, we may add a new independent
bit Xc to the private sources of users 2 and 3 as follows:
Z′1 := (Xa,Xb), Z
′
2 := (Xa,Xb,Xc), and Z
′
3 := (Xa,Xc),
where user i ∈ V observes the new source Z′i instead of Zi.
With such an increment to the private sources, the bit Xb can
also be used as a secret key in addition to Xa, i.e., the secret
key can be chosen as K = (Xa,Xb). To achieve this, user 2
can reveal in public the XOR F := Xb⊕Xc, and so user 3 can
recover Xb by subtracting Xc from the sum. It can be shown
that K is independent of F and is therefore kept secret from a
wiretapper observing the entire public discussion. The secrecy
capacity is now equal to 2 bits.
In the above, the addition of the private common random-
ness Xc increased the secrecy capacity by 1 bit. If we are
allowed to choose who to give this common randomness to,
the current choice of users 2 and 3 is in fact the most efficient
(besides the equivalent choice of users 1 and 3). For example,
if Xc were given to users 1 and 2 instead, then it is evident
that the capacity would not have increased. Of course, one may
choose to give Xc to user 1 in addition to users 2 and 3, where
the capacity would be 2 bits. However, such an allocation is
not considered efficient since additional resources, e.g., private
communication, may be needed to give Xc to user 1.
For DSKA, we consider removing some common random-
ness from a subset of users, while trying not to diminish the
secrecy capacity. It is easy to see that removing Xb from
users 1 and 2 does not diminish the capacity, while removing
Xa from all the users does.2 In other words, the common
randomness Xb is redundant but Xa is not. We can therefore
consider the following simpler source for the purpose of
achieving the secrecy capacity of 1 bit:
Z′′i := Xa for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Simplifying the source is useful because it simplifies the
capacity-achieving scheme in [1] by reducing the amount of
discussion required for the communication for omniscience.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We will formulate ISKA and DSKA as extensions of the
secret key agreement problem in [1] under the source model
without wiretapper’s side information nor helpers. Readers
may refer to [1] for the detailed secret key agreement pro-
tocol. In our formulation, we will only need the character-
ization (1.2a) [3] of the secrecy capacity. In this paper, we
primarily denote sets with capital letters, random variables
2Note that we remove a common randomness from all the users observing
it. The source is simpler after such a removal since its joint entropy reduces
strictly by the amount of common randomness we remove. It is possible to
extend this to more general multi-letter preprocessing of the random source,
and doing so is potentially more useful for non-hypergraphical sources.
with the sans-serif font, and families of sets with script
typeface letters. Furthermore, for a family F of sets, we will
use minimalF and maximalF to denote, respectively, the
sets of inclusion-wise minimal and maximal elements of F .
A. Incremental secret key agreement
To formulate ISKA, we consider adding a common random-
ness X of entropy  > 0 to a subset S of users:
Definition 3.1 For S ⊆ V and  > 0, we say that ZS,V is an
(S, )-incremented source of ZV if it can be written as
ZS,i :=
{
(Zi,X) i ∈ S
Zi otherwise,
(3.1)
where X is independent of ZV and has entropy H(X) = . 2
We want to characterize the rate of increase in the secrecy
capacity (1.2a) of the incremented source:
Definition 3.2 The subderivative (one-sided limit)
ρ+S (ZV ) :=
∂I(ZS,V )
∂
∣∣∣
=0+
= lim
↓0
I(ZS,V )− I(ZV )

(3.2)
is the growth rate of the secrecy capacity for the private source
ZV with respect to an infinitesimal increment in the common
randomness of the subset S. Since the additional common
randomness X is a valuable resource, we want to maximize
the growth rate among all subsets S of the same size as in
ρ+k (ZV ) := max
S⊆V :|S|≤k
ρ+S (ZV ) (3.3)
for integer k. We refer to ρ+k as the growth rate of order k.2
For an efficient allocation of common randomness, we want
to identify small subsets with strictly positive growth rate:
Definition 3.3 S ⊆ V is said to be a critical (hyper)edge if
it is inclusion-wise minimal with ρ+S (ZV ) > 0. We use
Scrit(ZV ) := minimal
{
S ⊆ V | ρ+S (ZV ) > 0
}
(3.4)
to denote the set of all critical edges.3 2
(We remark that a critical edge S is an edge in the (S, )-
incremented source.) Out of all the critical edges, the subsets
with minimum size require the least resource. It is easy to
argue that the minimum critical edges are the optimal solutions
to (3.3) for the smallest k such that ρ+k (ZV ) > 0.
B. Decremental secret key agreement
To formulate the DSKA problem, we will consider a special
kind of random sources:
3Unlike [14], the word critical is associated with an edge rather than a set
family for a non-asymptotic hypergraphical source. Furthermore, the notion
of critical family in [14] is related to the notion of excess edge in DSKA
rather than the notion of critical edge in the ISKA problem. We also consider
an asymptotic source model that is not restricted to be hypergraphical.
3Definition 3.4 We say that a source ZV has an edge S ⊆ V
if there is a common randomness X′ that is observed only by
the users in S, i.e., if we can rewrite Zi (up to bijection) as
Zi =
{
(Z′i,X
′) i ∈ S
Z′i otherwise,
(3.5)
where Z′V is independent of X
′. We reduce such a source to
the following (S, )-decremented source by removing an  ∈
(0, H(X′)] amount of common randomness X′:
ZS,−i =
{
(Z′i,X) i ∈ S
Z′i
(3.6)
for some common randomness X independent of Z′V and with
H(X) = H(X′)− . 2
Contrary to ISKA, we are interested in the rate of decrease
in the secrecy capacity (1.2a):
Definition 3.5 The subderivative (one-sided limit)
ρ−S (ZV ) := −∂I(Z
S,−
V )
∂
∣∣∣
=0+
= lim
↓0
I(ZV )− I(ZS,−V )

, (3.7)
is the loss rate of the secrecy capacity for the private source
ZV with edge S. 2
Unlike ISKA, we are interested in edges S with zero loss rate.
Definition 3.6 S ⊆ V is said to be an excess or redundant
edge if the corresponding loss rate is 0 for the source ZV
with edge S. In this case, we can simplify the secret key
agreement by removing common randomness of the edge S
without diminishing the secrecy capacity. 2
IV. MAIN RESULTS
As pointed out by [6, 18] and elaborated in [4], the MMI can
be computed in polynomial time using submodular function
minimization [19] algorithms. A polynomial time algorithm
was also given by an earlier work of Fujishige [20, 21] for
a more general type of submodular functions and set family.
It turns out that the characterization and computation of the
growth rate, loss rate, critical edges, and excess edges depend
only on the optimal partitions that attain the MMI (1.2a). The
set of the optimal partitions will be denoted by
Π∗(ZV ) := {P ∈ Π′(V ) | IP(ZV ) = I(ZV )}. (4.1)
Using the combinatorial result of [22], the set Π∗(ZV )∪ {V }
forms a lattice, and hence admits a unique finest partitionm
P∗(ZV ) := minΠ∗(ZV ). (4.2)
Here, the minimum is with respect to the partial order “≺”
of the partitions, which is defined as P ≺ P ′ if the partition
P is finer than (or a refinement of ) the partition P ′. In other
words, P can be obtained by further partitioning one or more
subsets in P ′. Following [4], we will refer to the finest partition
P∗(ZV ) as the fundamental partition. This partition has an
elegant interpretation [12] in data clustering, and furthermore,
can be computed in strongly polynomial time using algorithms
such as [23] applied to the minimum average cost clustering.
For ISKA, we can characterize the growth rate and critical
edges using the optimal partitions as follows:
Theorem 4.1 For any ZV and S ⊆ V ,
ρ+S (ZV ) = minP∈Π∗(ZV )
∑
C∈P χ{C∩S 6=∅} − χ{S 6=∅}
|P| − 1 , (4.3a)
where χ is the indicator function of the condition specified in
the subscript. It follows that
Scrit(ZV ) = minimal{S ⊆ V |
S 6⊆ C,∀C ∈ P ∈ Π∗(ZV )}. (4.3b)
In other words, S ⊆ V is critical iff it is a minimal set that
overlaps at least two blocks of every optimal partition. 2
PROOF See Appendix A. 
Indeed, Scrit(ZV ) depends on ZV only through the coarsest
optimal partitions in Π∗(ZV ). This is because, if S crosses
a partition, i.e., overlaps at least two blocks of the partition,
then it must also cross any refinement of the partition.
For DSKA, we can similarly characterize the loss rate and
excess edges as follows:
Theorem 4.2 For any ZV with edge S ⊆ V ,
ρ−S (ZV ) = maxP∈Π∗(ZV )
∑
C∈P χ{C∩S 6=∅} − χ{S 6=∅}
|P| − 1 . (4.4a)
It follows that S is an excess edge iff
∃C ∈ P∗(ZV ), S ⊆ C, (4.4b)
i.e., S does not cross the fundamental partition. 2
PROOF See Appendix A. 
The condition for an excess edge depends only on the fun-
damental partition, and therefore can be checked in strongly
polynomial time.
Equations (4.3a) and (4.3b) imply the following simple
properties of ρ+k (3.3) and Scrit.
Proposition 4.1 ρ+k (ZV ) is non-decreasing in k and equal to
0 for k ≤ 1. Furthermore,
ρ+k (ZV ) = 1 iff k ≥ |P∗(ZV )|,
the size of the fundamental partition. Finally, we have at least
one critical edge, i.e. Scrit(ZV ) 6= ∅, and the minimum size of a
critical edge is at least 2, i.e., min{|S| | S ∈ Scrit(ZV )} ≥ 2.2
PROOF See Appendix A. 
Computing ρ+k in general can be quite difficult but some
simple cases will be given in the next section. Surprisingly, it
turns out that computing a minimum critical edge can be done
in strongly polynomial time, which is due to the result below.
Theorem 4.3 All critical edges in Scrit(ZV ) have the same
size, and are therefore minimum. 2
In other words, all the critical edges are minimum. A critical
edge can be obtained easily as follows: Starting with S = V ,
repeatedly remove an element from S as long as doing so does
4not violate I(ZS,1V ) > I(ZV ). The condition can be checked
in strongly polynomial time for at most O(|V |2) times.
Indeed, a stronger result can be proved. We will characterize
the critical edges completely using only the maximal blocks
from the optimal partitions,
Tmax(ZV ) := maximal
⋃
Π∗(ZV ) (4.5)
which can also be computed in strongly polynomial time.
More precisely, we can show that:
Lemma 4.1 Either one of the following cases happen:
Tmax(ZV ) ∈ Π∗(ZV )
T¯max(ZV ) := {V \ C : C ∈ Tmax(ZV )} ∈ Π′(U)
(4.6)
(4.7)
for some U ⊆ V . In words, either Tmax(ZV ) is an optimal
partition or its complement T¯max(ZV ) is a set of at least
two non-empty disjoint subsets of V . Indeed, (4.6) means that
Tmax(ZV ) is the unique coarsest optimal partition. 2
Theorem 4.4 If (4.6) happens,
Scrit(ZV ) = {{i, j} | i ∈ C, j ∈ V \ C,C ∈ Tmax(ZV )}
(4.8)
and so all the critical edges have size 2. If (4.7) happens,
Scrit(ZV ) = {{iC | C ∈ Tmax(ZV )} | iC ∈ V \ C}, (4.9)
which is taken to mean the collection of the sets {iC | C ∈
Tmax(ZV )} of representatives iC of subsets V \ C for C ∈
Tmax(ZV ). It follows that |Tmax(ZV )| is the size of all the
critical edges. 2
Note that, Theorem 4.4 implies Theorem 4.3 immediately.
PROOF See Appendix B. 
Example 4.1 Consider V = {1, 2, 3}. Let Z1 = Z2 be a
uniformly random bit, and Z3 = 0. It can be shown that
Π∗(ZV ) = {{{1, 2}, {3}}}
Scrit(ZV ) = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}.
There is a unique optimal partition and so Tmax(ZV ) =
P∗(ZV ) = {{1, 2}, {3}} ∈ Π∗(ZV ), satisfying (4.6). The set
of critical edges by (4.8) is Scrit(ZV ) = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}.
Indeed, (4.6) may hold even when the optimal partition is
not unique. For instance, consider V = {1, 2, 3} and let Z1 :=
(Xa,Xb,Xc), Z2 :=(Xa,Xb,Xd) and Z3 :=(Xc,Xd) where Xi’s
are uniformly random and independent bits. It follows that
Π∗(ZV ) = {{{1, 2}, {3}}, {{1}, {2}, {3}}}
Tmax(ZV ) = {{1, 2}, {3}} ∈ Π∗(ZV )
Scrit(ZV ) = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}
which satisfies (4.6) but Tmax is the coarsest partition rather
than the fundamental partition. 2
Example 4.2 Let V = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and
Z1 = Xa, Z2 = (Xa,Xb), Z3 = (Xb,Xc), and Z4 = Xc
where Xi’s are independent uniformly random bits. The
optimal partitions in Π∗(ZV ) are shown in Fig. 1b, and
Tmax(ZV ) = {{1, 2, 3}, {2, 3, 4}}. Although Tmax(ZV ) is
not an optimal partition, T¯max(ZV ) = {{4}, {1}}, which
satisfies (4.7). By (4.9), the set of minimum critical edges
is Scrit(ZV ) = {{1, 4}}. It crosses at least two blocks of
every coarsest optimal partition, and therefore every optimal
partition.
Example 4.2 is a special case of the pairwise independent
network (PIN) source model [24], where in this example the
source is simply a tree, see Fig. 1a. For tree PINs in general,
it can be argued that a partition P ∈ Π′(V ) is optimal
iff each block C ∈ P induces a tree on C. For example,
the optimal partition {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} in Fig. 1b induces two
subtrees, one connecting 1 and 2, and the other connecting 3
and 4. Thus, the fundamental partition is always the partition
into singletons, but it is not the only optimal partition for
|V | ≥ 3. Nevertheless, we can show that there is only one
critical edge and such an edge is equal to the set of leaves.2
V. COMPUTING THE GROWTH RATE OF DIFFERENT ORDERS
In this section, we will illustrates the computation of ρ+k in
(3.3). There are simple cases where ρ+k (and therefore Scrit)
can be computed easily. For example, in the special case when
the fundamental partition is the unique optimal partition, i.e.
|Π∗(ZV )| = 1, it can be argued easily from (4.3a) that
ρ+k (ZV ) =
k − 1
|P∗(ZV )| − 1 for k ≤ |P
∗(ZV )|,
where an optimal solution S to (3.3) is any set of k elements,
each from a different block of the fundamental partition. In
particular,
Scrit(ZV ) = {{i, j} | i ∈ C, j ∈ V \ C,C ∈ P∗(ZV )}
and so all the critical edges are minimum with size 2. When the
partition into singletons is the unique optimal partition, then
the optimal solution S to (3.3) is simply any k-subset of V .
In particular, the singleton partition is shown to be the unique
optimal partition in [7] for any PIN model that corresponds to a
complete graph. We can also show the same result for any PIN
model that corresponds to a cycle. In general, it is possible to
check in strongly polynomial time whether the fundamental
partition is the unique optimal partition. (See Appendix C.)
For instance, in Example 4.1, the optimal partition is unique
and all the critical edges have size 2 as expected. More details
about the computation and interpretations of the fundamental
partition can be found in [4].
When the optimal partition is not unique, ρ+k (ZV ) may not
be linear in k. The marginal increase in growth rate may not
be diminishing in k either. This is the case, for instance, for
Example 4.2 as shown in Fig. 1c.
If H(ZB) is an integer for every B ⊆ V , then ρ+S (ZV )
can be computed in strongly polynomial time. To argue this,
choose  = 1|V |! . Note that IP(ZV )/ is an integer and so
IP(ZV ) for different P ∈ Π′(V )\Π∗(ZV ) is larger than I(ZV )
by at least , while I(ZS,V ) is larger than I(ZV ) by at most .
Thus, Π∗(ZS,V ) ⊆ Π∗(ZV ) and so ρ+S (ZV ) = I(Z
S,
V )−I(ZV )
 .
Each term on the R.H.S. can be computed in strongly poly-
nomial time. A more refined argument suggests that one can
choose any  ≤ 1(|V |−1)(|V |−2) .
51
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(a) Pairwise independent network ZV .
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(c) Rate of increase ρ+k (ZV ).
Fig. 1: Optimal partitions and rate of increase of the tree network in Example 4.2.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have formulated the ISKA and DSKA
problems to study how the MMI of a set of random variables
changes with respect to an infinitesimal increment and decre-
ment in the MMI of a subset of the random variables. We
found that the set of opimal partitions that attain the MMI of
a set of random variables completely characterizes the growth
rate for ISKA and the loss rate for DSKA.
For ISKA, the growth rate can be computed easily in some
special cases, e.g., when the optimal partition is unique. In
general, however, it is not clear whether the computation can
be done in polynomial time. The growth rate can be non-linear
in the order, and the marginal return may even increase as
we increase the order. Very surprisingly, however, a minimum
critical edge can be computed in strongly polynomial time
because all critical edges have the same size. In other words,
one can easily identify a minimum subset of users to give
an additional common randomness to, such that the secrecy
capacity strictly increases. For DSKA, the condition for an
edge to be redundant can be characterized in strongly polyno-
mial time using the fundamental partition. Identifying excess
edges is useful in simplifying secret key agreement schemes.
In particular, it is hopeful that further investigation can resolve
the conjectures regarding the communication complexity for
secret key agreement [15–17].
APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF BASIC PROPERTIES
PROOF (THEOREM 4.1) Clearly, ρ+∅ (ZV ) = 0. Consider S ⊆
V : S 6= ∅. Rewriting the divergence in terms of the entropy
as D(PZV ‖
∏
C∈P PZC ) =
∑
C∈P H(ZC)−H(ZV ), we have
I(Z,SV ) = minP∈Π′(V )
1
|P| − 1
[∑
C∈P
H(Z,SC )−H(Z,SV )
]
= min
P∈Π′(V )
1
|P| − 1
[ ∑
C∈P
H(ZC)−H(ZV )
+
∑
C∈P
H(X)χ{S∩C 6=∅} −H(X)
]
= min
P∈Π′(V )
[
IP(ZV ) + 
∑
C∈P χ{C∩S 6=∅} − 1
|P| − 1
]
.
Suppose I(Z,SV ) < minP∈Π′(V )\Π∗(ZV ) IP(ZV ), which is
possible for all  > 0 sufficiently small since |Π′(V )| is finite.
It does not lose optimality to restrict P to Π∗(ZV ) and so we
have for all  > 0 sufficiently small that
I(Z,SV ) = I(ZV ) +  minP∈Π∗(ZV )
∑
C∈P∗ χ{C∩S 6=∅} − 1
|P| − 1
which gives (4.3a). (4.3b) follows from (4.3a) directly. 
PROOF (THEOREM 4.2) The proof of (4.4a) is analogous to
the proof of (4.3a) above, but we have max instead of min
due to a sign change because the rate is on the loss rather
than growth of the MMI. To derive the condition (4.4b) for
excess edge, notice that (4.4a) is zero iff S does not cross any
optimal partitions. It suffices to consider only the finest optimal
partition, namely P∗(ZV ), because S does not cross P∗(ZV )
implies it does not cross any coarser optimal partitions, which
cover all the optimal partitions. 
PROOF (PROPOSITION 4.1) ρ+k (ZV ) is non-decreasing in k
because ρ+S (ZV ) by (4.3a) is non-decreasing in S with respect
to set inclusion. It is equal to 0 for k = 1 because ρ+{i}(ZV ) =
0 for all i ∈ V . This also means that a critical edge, if any,
must be non-singleton, with size at least two. ρ+k (ZV ) is at
most 1 because ρ+V (ZV ) = 1. More precisely, ρ
+
S (ZV ) = 1
iff S ∩ C 6= ∅ for every C ∈ P∗ and P∗ ∈ Π∗(ZV ). Since
the fundamental partition P∗(ZV ) is the unique finest optimal
partition, we have ρ+S (ZV ) = 1 iff S ∩ C 6= ∅ for every
C ∈ P∗(ZV ). That means ρ+S (ZV ) < 1 if |S| < absP∗(ZV ),
and ρ+S (ZV ) = 1 for any S obtained by taking at least one
element from each block in the fundamental partition. The fact
that ρ+V (ZV ) = 1 also means that there is at least one critical
edge. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.4
PROOF (THEOREM 4.4) From (4.3b), we have S ∈ Scrit(ZV )
iff
S 6⊆ C or equiv. S \ C 6= ∅ ∀C ∈ Tmax(ZV ). (B.1)
From this, it can be argued easily that the sets defined in
(4.8) and (4.9) are critical edges for the cases (4.6) and (4.7)
respectively. If S is a critical edge under (4.6), any element,
say i ∈ S, must be contained by some C ∈ Tmax(ZV ) since
Tmax(ZV ) is a partition of V . By (B.1), it must contain an
element j ∈ V \C and so S must be in (4.8) as desired. If S
is a critical edge under (4.7), it must contain an element from
V \C for every C ∈ Tmax(ZV ) by (B.1). Thus, it must be in
(4.9) as desired. 
6It remains to prove Lemma 4.1. We do so using the idea
of zero-singleton-submodular function in [22]. Denote the
fundamental partition as
P∗(ZV ) = (C∗1 , . . . , C
∗
` ) (B.2)
by indexing the blocks from 1 to ` = |P∗(ZV )|. Define g :
2[`] 7→ R as
g(B) := hγ
(⋃
i∈B C
∗
i
)
−
∑
i∈B
hγ(C
∗
i ) for B ⊆ [`] (B.3)
with γ := I(RZV ) and hγ(C) := H(ZC)− γ is the residual
randomness defined in [4]. It follows immediately that g is
submodular with
g({i}) = 0 for i ∈ [`], (B.4)
and is therefore called a zero-singleton-submodular function.
It can also be shown to be non-negative over non-empty sets.
Proposition B.1 ([22, p.198]) g(B) ≥ 0 for all B ⊆ [`] :
B 6= ∅. The zero sets of g,
Z(g) := {B ⊆ [`] : g(B) = 0} (B.5)
forms an intersecting family, i.e.
U ∩W,U ∪W ∈ Z(g) for all U,W ∈ Z(g) : U ∩W 6= ∅
(B.6)
Furthermore,{⋃
i∈B C
∗
i : B ∈ Z(g)
}
=
⋃
Π∗(ZV ) ∪ {V }, (B.7)
and so
⋃
Π∗(ZV ) ∪ {V } is also an intersecting family. 2
PROOF For any partition P ∈ Π([`]),
g[P] :=
∑
C∈P
g(C)
=
∑
C∈P
hγ
(⋃
i∈C C
∗
i
)
−
∑`
i=1
hγ(C
∗
i )
= hγ
[{⋃
i∈C C
∗
i : C ∈ P
}]
− hγ [P∗(ZV )] ≥ 0,
because, by [4, Theorem 5.1], P∗(ZV ) minimizes hγ over
all partitions of V , which include {⋃i∈C C∗i : C ∈ P}.
Furthermore, we have equality g[P] = 0 for P ∈ Π′([`]) iff{⋃
i∈C C
∗
i : C ∈ P
}
∈ Π∗(ZV ).
Suppose to the contrary that g(B) < 0 for some non-empty
B ⊆ [`]. Then, g[{B} ∪ {{i}, i ∈ [`] \ B}] < 0 by the zero-
singleton property (B.4), but this contradicts g[P] ≥ 0 above
for all P ∈ Π([`]). This proves the non-negativity of g over
non-empty sets.
For U,W ∈ Z(g) : U ∩W 6= ∅, we have
0 ≥ g(U)− g(U ∩W ) ≥ g(U ∪W )− g(W ) ≥ 0
where the second inequality is by the submodularity of g, and
the first and last inequalities are because g(U) = g(W ) = 0
and g(U ∩ W ), g(U ∪ W ) ≥ 0 by the non-negativity of g
over non-empty sets argued above. Thus, all inequalities are
satisfied with equality and so g(U ∩W ) = g(U ∪W ) = 0 as
desired for Z(g) to be an intersecting family.
It remains to prove (B.7). By [4, Theorem 5.2], every
partition in Π∗(ZV )∪ {{V }} is coarser than P∗(ZV ) and can
therefore be expressed as {⋃i∈C C∗i : C ∈ P} ∈ Π′(V ) for
some P ∈ Π′([`]). By optimality, g[P] = 0, and so g(C) = 0
for all C ∈ P since C is non-empty and g is non-negative
over non-empty sets as argued before. Conversely, suppose
g(B) = 0. Then g[{B} ∪ {{i}, i ∈ [`] \ B}] = 0 by (B.4),
and so
⋃
i∈B C
∗
i is a block of an optimal partition, namely
{⋃i∈B C∗i } ∪ {C∗i : i ∈ [`] \ B}. This completes the proof
of (B.7). Since C∗i ’s are disjoint, the fact that Z(g) is an
intersecting family implies that
⋃
Π∗(ZV ) ∪ {V } is. 
PROOF (LEMMA 4.1) We first argue that: for any distinct
C1, C2 ∈ Tmax(ZV ), we have
C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅ implies C1 ∪ C2 = V. (B.8)
To show this, note that C1 and C2 are maximal sets
from
⋃
Π∗(ZV ) by definition (4.5). By Proposition B.1,⋃
Π∗(ZV )∪{V } is an intersecting family and so C1∩C2 6= ∅
implies C1 ∪C2 is also in the family. Suppose to the contrary
that C1 ∪ C2 6= V , then C1 ∪ C2 is a strictly larger set in⋃
Π∗(ZV ) than the distinct sets C1 and C2, which contradicts
the maximality.
Next, we argue that if there exists distinct C1, C2 ∈
Tmax(ZV ) such that C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅, then
C ∩ C ′ 6= ∅ for all C,C ′ ∈ Tmax(ZV ). (B.9)
Indeed, we have a stronger statement that
∅ 6= (V \ C1) ⊆ C for all C ∈ Tmax(ZV ) \ {C1}. (B.10)
If C = C2, we have (B.10) directly from (B.8). Suppose C 6=
C2. Then, C1 ∩ C 6= ∅ because C ∩ V \ C2 6= ∅ by the
maximality of C 6= C2, and V \ C2 ⊆ C1 by (B.8) that
C1 ∪ C2 = V . Applying (B.8) again with C2 replaced by
C, we have C1 ∪ C = V as desired.
By the contrapositive statement of (B.10), if C1 ∩ C2 = ∅
for some distinct C1, C2 ∈ Tmax(ZV ), then all the sets in
Tmax(ZV ) must be disjoint, and so we have (4.6) since every
element in V must be covered by at least one block of
an optimal partition. In the other case when every distinct
C1, C2 ∈ Tmax(ZV ) must intersect, (B.8) implies C1 ∪ C2 =
V , or equivalently, (V \ C1) ∩ (V \ C2) = ∅, which implies
(4.7) as desired. 
By (B.7), Tmax(ZV ) can be obtained from the maximal zero
sets in Z(g) together with the fundamental partitions P∗(ZV ).
The maximal zero set not containing an element i ∈ [`], can
be computed in strongly polynomial time as follows: Starting
with C = ∅, add an element from [`] \ {i} to C repeatedly
as long as minC′∈2[`]\{i}:C⊆C′ g(C ′) = 0. The minimization
is repeated at most O(|V |2) times and can be solved in
strongly polynomial time using some existing algorithm for
submodular function minimization over a lattice family [19].
Hence, Tmax(ZV ) and therefore Scrit(ZV ) can be computed in
strongly polynomial time by Theorem 4.4.
7Conjecture:
Does critical edges have the same rate of increase? We
conjecture that ρ+S =
|S|−1
|P∗(ZV )|−1 for all S ∈ Scrit(ZV ).
APPENDIX C
UNIQUENESS OF THE OPTIMAL PARTITION
To check whether there is a unique optimal partition in
strongly polynomial time, we can make use of the zero-
singleton-submodular function g defined in (B.3) based on
the fundamental partition P∗(ZV ) and the MMI. In essense
of (B.7), we only need to check whether the zero sets
Z(g) in (B.5) consists only of the singletons. This can
computed in O(|V |2) submodular function minimizations,
namely minB⊇{i,j} g(B) for all pair (i, j) of distinct elements.
P∗(ZV ) and I(ZV ) can also be computed in O(|V |2) submod-
ular function minimizations [23].
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